United Nations S/2000/683

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2000

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1301 (2000) of 31 May 2000, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 July 2000 and requested me to provide an assessment of the situation before the end of that mandate. The Security Council acted in the expectation that the parties, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y del Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), would offer my Personal Envoy, James Baker III, specific and concrete proposals that can be agreed to in order to resolve the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the settlement plan and to explore all ways and means to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution to their dispute over Western Sahara. The present report covers developments since my previous report to the Council, dated 22 May 2000 (S/2000/461).

II. Developments during the reporting period

A. Second meeting of the parties under the auspices of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General (London, 28 June 2000)

2. Pursuant to the provisions of Security Council resolution 1301 (2000), the parties were invited to meet in London, on 28 June 2000, under the auspices of my Personal Envoy. The letters of invitation specified that the discussions would be held under the same conditions as those during the meeting held in May, namely, that the talks would be private and direct and that no issue would be considered as finally agreed until every outstanding issue had been agreed. The two neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, were invited to attend the London meeting as observers. There was a frank and full exchange of views during the discussions. Each party was asked by my Personal Envoy to present its proposals.

3. The Frente POLISARIO identified two areas of difficulty, namely, the conduct of the appeals process and the repatriation of refugees. With regard to the appeals process, the Frente POLISARIO reiterated its willingness to cooperate with the United Nations to resolve all problems encountered in the implementation of the settlement plan and to examine any proposals to be made by the United Nations aimed at launching the appeals process. Concerning the repatriation of refugees, the Frente POLISARIO reconfirmed its commitment to continue its cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in carrying out its mission according to normal practices and principles concerning repatriation.

4. The Frente POLISARIO reaffirmed its commitment to the implementation of the confidence-building measures proposed by UNHCR and its attachment to the settlement plan and the Houston Agreements. The Frente POLISARIO also reiterated its promise to respect the results of the referendum of self-determination and expressed its hope that Morocco would do the same. The Frente POLISARIO delegation stressed that it would be up to the Security Council to take the necessary measures to ensure respect of the

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referendum results. However, there were no specific proposals from the Frente POLISARIO to resolve the multiple problems of the settlement plan that the parties could agree to.

5. Morocco identified four areas which in its view were impeding the implementation of the settlement plan, namely, the conduct of the appeals process; the reversal of the identification results for some 7,000 applicants, which, in Morocco's view, should be reinstated; the repatriation of Saharan refugees; and the issue of Saharans who had reached voting age after December 1993 but had not been included in the identification process. According to Morocco, those individuals should be identified or at least permitted to lodge appeals in order to allow all Saharans to participate in the referendum. Morocco added that it would not take part in a referendum where any Saharans who might be entitled to vote were not allowed to do so. In Morocco's view, the right to self-determination meant the right of all Saharans to decide their fate.

6. With respect to the appeals process, Morocco identified two areas of concern, namely, the question of the admissibility of appeals, which it considered should be limited to a procedural review with the appeals forwarded to the Appeals Chamber; and the issue of the concurrent testimony by two tribal leaders (sheikhs), which Morocco found to be unacceptable since it would be prejudicial to the appellants as it had been during the identification process. Morocco stated that during the appeals process it would not agree to submit testimony by new witnesses in the presence of the POLISARIO sheikhs.

7. Concerning the repatriation of refugees, Morocco considered that UNHCR should ascertain the wishes of all refugees, and that for security, economic and political reasons repatriation could not take place to the east of the berm. Morocco also reiterated its willingness to cooperate with UNHCR in implementing the confidence-building measures and felt that the repatriation could be completed before the end of 2000. Morocco promised to support all efforts by the United Nations to address the injustices that, in its view, had been perpetrated against thousands of authentic Saharans and to remain a true partner to the United Nations in the search for a definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara. However, there were no specific proposals from Morocco to resolve the multiple problems of the settlement plan that the parties could agree to.

8. In addition to the areas of difficulty highlighted by the parties, my Personal Envoy indicated that, in his view, other issues remained unresolved, namely, enforcement of the results of the referendum; release of prisoners of war and Saharan political detainees; and possible problems relating to the implementation of the code of conduct for the referendum campaign. My Personal Envoy also expressed concern that the parties had so far failed to negotiate the problems, as there still existed a high level of animosity between them. According to him, neither party had shown any disposition to depart from the "winner-take-all" mentality or appeared willing to discuss any possible political solutions in which each would get some, but not all, of what it wanted and would allow the other side to do the same. After asking each party for concrete proposals to bridge their differences and receiving none, my Personal Envoy expressed the view that, in the light of the above, the meeting, instead of resolving problems, had in fact moved things backwards as it had deepened the differences between the parties.

9. My Personal Envoy then appealed to the parties, stating that, even though there appeared to be no imminent political solution to the problems, a return to violence should not be entertained as an acceptable alternative. He asked the parties to meet again in order to arrive at a political solution, explaining that for such a solution several options existed. There could be a negotiated agreement for full integration of Western Sahara with Morocco, or for full independence, although in his view, neither prospect appeared likely. Alternatively, a negotiated agreement could produce a solution somewhere between those two results. Still another political solution could be an agreement that would permit a successful implementation of the settlement plan. He reiterated to the parties that, should they agree to discuss a political solution other than the settlement plan, they would not prejudice their final positions since, according to the rules of the consultations, nothing would be agreed to until everything had been agreed to.

10. Closing the meeting, my Personal Envoy asked the parties to participate in expert-level meetings at Geneva to address the questions of the appeals process, prisoners of war and refugees. To that effect, my Special Representative, William Eagleton, and the

Deputy to my Personal Envoy, John R. Bolton, will visit Geneva later this month to meet with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNHCR and the parties.

11. I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for once again hosting these important talks.

B. Other developments

12. During the reporting period, my Special Representative and the Chairman of the Identification Commission maintained contacts with the parties in Rabat and Tindouf to ensure follow-up on the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 1301 (2000). As part of his regular consultations, my Special Representative met, on 12 and 13 June, with the Moroccan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Taieb Fassi Fihri, and with the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, Ahmed Snoussi. On 19 June, he met with the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, Mohamed Abdelaziz, and with the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO, M'hamed Khaddad.

13. On my way to the Middle East, I briefly visited the Kingdom of Morocco on 17 June 2000 where I met with King Mohammed VI and Prince Moulay Rachid.

C. Appeals process

14. During the reporting period, the Chairman of the Identification Commission continued his consultations with the Coordinators of the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO on the implementation of the work programme of the Commission.

15. The Identification Commission has almost completed its work on data processing and analysis of the files received during the first round of appeals. A comprehensive inventory of all the identification and appeals files was undertaken which would allow the computerized archiving of all forms and documents contained in the files, as well as easy access and on-line communication with all the sections of the Appeals Chamber. The Commission has also completed an extensive programme of family research with a view to ascertaining the claims of the appellants regarding the existence of immediate family members included in the provisional voter lists.

16. Following a meeting of Identification Commission members in Agadir on 27 and 28 May 2000, a training manual was finalized to ensure a consistent modus operandi in the application of the provisions of the Appeals Procedures and Operational Directives, as well as a training kit containing all the relevant documents and guidelines on the use of the admissibility processing software. One-week training programmes for all Commission staff began at Laayoune on 12 June 2000 and will be completed next month.

17. A tentative work programme on the admissibility technical review has been prepared and informally submitted to the parties. In the meantime, following the publication of the second part of the provisional voter lists, the Commission continues to work on data processing and analysis of 54,889 appeals files.

18. I wish to place on record my appreciation for the close cooperation extended to MINURSO by the observer delegation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) led by Ambassador Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia), in support of the implementation of the settlement plan. OAU provides a valuable service, briefing visiting dignitaries and delegations on the current state of the implementation of the plan.

D. Military aspects

19. As at 3 July 2000, the strength of the military component of MINURSO stood at the authorized strength of 230 military personnel (see annex). Under the command of General Claude Buze (Belgium), the military component continued to monitor the ceasefire between the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente POLISARIO military forces, which came into effect on 6 September 1991. During the reporting period, the area of responsibility of MINURSO remained calm. Despite a noticeable increase in the military training activities of Frente POLISARIO, there have been no indications that either side intends to resume hostilities within the foreseeable future.

20. Progress continued in the implementation of the agreements between MINURSO and the two parties on the marking and disposal of mines and unexploded ordnance and the exchange of related information. During the period from 13 May to 3 July 2000, 278

mines and unexploded ordnance were marked and 124 destroyed on the Moroccan side, while 488 were marked and 177 destroyed on the Frente POLISARIO side.

E. Civilian police aspects

21. The current strength of the civilian police component of MINURSO stands at 46 civilian police officers, down from 80 in May, under the command of Inspector General Om Prakash Rathor (India). MINURSO civilian police officers continue to protect files and sensitive material at the Identification Commission centres at Laayoune and Tindouf.

F. Preparatory work for the repatriation of Saharan refugees

22. During the reporting period, UNHCR, in close consultation and cooperation with MINURSO, continued with its preparatory work for the repatriation of Saharan refugees, as provided for under the settlement plan. While consultations continued between UNHCR and the parties, it was noted that certain activities, such as the cross-border confidence-building measures, could start only after the parties and the refugees had agreed to the modalities for implementing those measures.

23. UNHCR continued its activities related to pre-registration and needs assessment of the refugees in the Tindouf camps, using the MINURSO provisional voter lists. UNHCR is currently engaged in the electronic data processing of all pre-registered refugees, after which it will complete the pre-registration of those refugees who were away from the camps during the pre-registration phase. As an integral part of its responsibilities, UNHCR intends to conduct a census in the camps to ascertain the number of refugees who were not included in the MINURSO provisional lists of voters. During the pre-registration exercise and other contacts with the refugees, the vast majority continued to express their desire to return only to the territory east of the berm. Pending the voluntary repatriation of the Saharan refugees, UNHCR continues to implement its care and maintenance assistance programme in the Tindouf camps.

24. The Prime Minister of Morocco, Abderrahman El-Youssoufi, visited UNHCR at Geneva on 27 June 2000 and had a courtesy meeting with the High Commissioner. General issues related to the UNHCR mandate were discussed, including the role of UNHCR in the context of the settlement plan and its refugee assistance programme for the Saharan refugees.

III. Financial aspects

25. The General Assembly, by its resolution 54/268 of 15 June 2000, appropriated the amount of $49.3 million, equivalent to a monthly rate of some $4.1 million, for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001. Therefore, should the Security Council approve my recommendation contained in paragraph 31 below, the cost of maintaining the Mission will be within the monthly rate approved by the General Assembly.

26. As at 30 June 2000, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO amounted to $73.4 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,970.5 million.

IV. Observations and recommendations

27. Despite the efforts by my Personal Envoy, there was no progress during the meeting held in London on 28 June between the parties in resolving any of the multiple problems impeding the implementation of the settlement plan. In fact, my Personal Envoy has pointed out to me, as he did to the parties at the end of the consultations, that the meeting, instead of resolving the problems, had moved things backwards.

28. After stating their respective positions, which were already known, neither party appeared willing to offer any concrete proposals to bridge the differences between them. They both insisted on a "winner-take-all" approach and did not appear willing to discuss a solution where each would get some, but not all, of what each wanted. Nor did they appear disposed to put aside mutual animosity and begin to negotiate a political solution that would resolve their dispute over Western Sahara.

29. As my Personal Envoy explained to the parties, a political solution could be a number of things, but most importantly, it would not be a military solution. Such a

solution could be: a negotiated agreement for full integration with Morocco; a negotiated agreement for full independence; a negotiated agreement for something in between; or a negotiated agreement that would permit a successful implementation of the settlement plan. It should be noted, however, that the positions of the parties in interpreting some of the key provisions of the settlement plan, and the problems encountered over the past nine years to achieve its implementation, do not augur well for that prospect. Obviously, arriving at a political solution is far more preferable than a breakdown of the process which might lead to a return to hostilities, something that must be avoided at all costs.

30. Concluding this rather bleak assessment of the current situation, I should like to suggest that the Security Council reflect on the problem of ensuring that the results of the referendum, were one to be held, are respected by the parties. In this regard, I should like to recall, as my Personal Envoy pointed out to the parties during the recent London meeting, and as already stated in paragraph 36 of my report of 26 February 2000 (S/2000/131), that there is no enforcement mechanism envisioned by the settlement plan, nor is one likely to be proposed, calling for the use of military means to effect enforcement.

31. Despite the lack of progress at the London meeting, I hope that during the forthcoming expert-level meetings in Geneva on the questions regarding appeals, prisoners of war and refugees some progress could be achieved. Following those consultations, I expect my Personal Envoy to meet again with the parties, in the presence of the two observer countries, to try once again to resolve the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the settlement plan and to try to agree upon any other political solution to their dispute over Western Sahara. In the meantime, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for a period of three months, until 31 October 2000.

Annex

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: contributions as at 12 July 2000

	Military observers	*Troops*	*Civilian police*	*Total*
Argentina	1			1
Austria	4			4
Bangladesh	6			6
Belgium	1*			0
China	16			16
Egypt	18			18
El Salvador	2			2
France	23			23
Ghana	6	7	9	22
Greece	1			1
Guinea	3			3
Honduras	12			12
Hungary	3		3	6
Ireland	6			6
India			10	10
Italy	5			5
Kenya	8			8
Malaysia	13			13
Nigeria	5		10	15
Norway			2	2
Pakistan	6			6
Poland	4			4
Portugal	5		3	8
Republic of Korea		20		20
Russian Federation	25			25
Senegal			6	6
Sweden			1	1
Uruguay	15			15
United States of America	15			15
Total	**202**	**27**	**44****	**272**

* Force Commander.

** Authorized strength is 81 and by the beginning of August full deployment is expected.



Map No. 3691 Rev. 29 UNITED NATIONS
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Note by the President of the Security Council

1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 October 1998 (S/1998/1016) and following consultations among the members of the Council, the members of the Council agreed to elect the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the following sanctions committees for a period running until 31 December 2000:

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) concerning Rwanda

Chairman:	His Excellency Mr. Moctar Ouane (Mali)
Vice-Chairmen:	Canada and Tunisia

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1298 (2000) concerning the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia

Chairman:	His Excellency Mr. Hasmy Agam (Malaysia)
Vice-Chairmen:	Argentina and Tunisia

2. The bureau of each of the above-mentioned sanctions committees will be composed as above for a term ending on 31 December 2000.

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Letter dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a joint communiqué by H.E. President Yoweri Museveni of the Republic of Uganda and H.E. President Ismail Omar Guelleh of the Republic of Djibouti regarding bilateral and regional issues towards peace and security in the Horn of Africa (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter, together with its annex, issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Prof. Semakula **Kiwanuka**, Ph.D
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations

00-53197 (E) 130700

Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint communiqué

1. At the invitation of H.E. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of the Republic of Uganda, H.E. President Ismail Omar Guelleh of the Republic of Djibouti paid a three-day official visit to Uganda, from 4 to 6 July 2000.

2. His Excellency Ismail Omar Guelleh was accompanied by the Hon. Elmi Obsieh Waiss, Minister of Commerce and Industry, and other senior government officials.

3. The two Heads of State met in a warm and cordial atmosphere, reflecting the friendly and fraternal relations existing between the peoples and Governments of Uganda and Djibouti. They held fruitful discussions on bilateral and regional issues.

4. President Ismail Guelleh noted with satisfaction the economic progress which Uganda has made under the able leadership of H.E. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. He commended the Government of Uganda for strengthening peace and stability in the country.

5. President Yoweri Museveni commended the contribution of the Republic of Djibouti towards peace and security in the Horn of Africa, and particularly for President Ismail Omar Guelleh's innovative peace initiative for Somalia. He noted that both countries should use their complementary efforts to further strengthen peace, security, stability and development in the region.

6. On bilateral cooperation, the two Heads of State stressed the need to explore ways of developing and strengthening trade relations between the two countries, particularly within the framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

7. In this regard they called for the establishment of a Uganda/Djibouti joint trade commission. They instructed the responsible ministers to embark on the necessary preparations without delay. In addition, they encouraged private sector cooperation through their respective chambers of commerce and industry.

8. On regional matters, the two Heads of State exchanged views on the problems affecting the region. They underscored the importance of negotiations to bring about political solutions to regional problems.

9. During his stay, H.E. President Ismail Omar Guelleh held a breakfast meeting with prominent Ugandan businessmen and exchanged views with them on how to improve business relations between the two countries. He later visited the Kiira power station and the source of the Nile in Jinja.

10. At the end of his visit, H.E. President Ismail Omar Guelleh expressed gratitude and satisfaction to President Museveni and the people of Uganda for the warm reception and cordial hospitality extended to him and his delegation during his stay in Uganda.

He invited his Ugandan counterpart to pay a return visit to Djibouti on a date that is mutually convenient. President Museveni gladly accepted.

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Identical letters dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a resolution adopted by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at its twenty-seventh session, held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 27 to 30 June 2000, under the agenda item entitled "The consequences of Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait and the necessity for Iraq to implement all the relevant Security Council resolutions" (see annex).

This resolution is a most eloquent response to the allegations and sophistries contained in Iraq's letters that were circulated in documents S/2000/502 and S/2000/572 [i.e. S/2000/622] and a most cogent proof of their falsehood. These letters charged Kuwait with harming the credibility of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and claimed falsely and slanderously that the position paper circulated by the OIC secretariat on the issue of the Kuwaiti prisoners and missing persons had no official or legal standing.

Reference to the resolution adopted by the most recent Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers will confirm that it is in full accord with all the points made in the paper describing the position taken by OIC that was circulated in document S/2000/478. The resolution also reaffirms previous OIC resolutions and renews the commitment of OIC members to the necessity of devising a solution to this humanitarian issue.

In this context, we should like to state that it would be advisable for the Iraqi Government to comply with all the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially those relating to the issue of the Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and missing persons, to resume its participation in the meetings of the Tripartite Commission and its Technical Subcommittee and to cooperate with the high-level Coordinator, Mr. Yuli M. Vorontsov, in implementation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), so as to bring an end to this long-standing human tragedy instead of reiterating false charges and accusations in a vain attempt to evade its legal, political and humanitarian responsibilities under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

All of these desiderata have been supported and affirmed in an unambiguous manner by OIC at all of its meetings and at both summit and ministerial levels. This confirms that, as expressed through its political organizations, the entire world is in

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agreement concerning the responsibility of the Government of Iraq to discharge its obligations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad A. **Abulhasan**
Permanent Representative

Annex to identical letters dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Resolution 16/27-P of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Kuala Lumpur, 30 June 2000)

The consequences of Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait and the necessity for Iraq to implement all the relevant Security Council resolutions

The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, meeting at its twenty-seventh session (Session of Islam and Globalization) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 27 to 30 June 2000,

Having taken cognizance of the report of the Secretary-General on the consequences of Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait and the necessity for Iraq to implement all the relevant Security Council resolutions (ICFM/27-2000/PIL/D.6),

Considering the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization, which call for strengthening Islamic solidarity among member States,

Taking note of recent developments in the situation between Iraq and Kuwait,

Mindful of the fundamental interests of the Islamic Ummah and of Islamic solidarity,

1. *Calls* on Iraq to pursue efforts towards the complete fulfilment of its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions for the establishment of security, peace and stability in the region;

2. *Welcomes* Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), in which, *inter alia*, the Council calls upon the Government of Iraq to resume full and effective cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and with the Tripartite Commission in Geneva established under its auspices, in the context of discharging its obligations under paragraphs 13 and 14 of the resolution and further reaffirms the need for compliance with the terms of paragraphs 2 (c) and 3 (c) of its resolution 686 (1991) and paragraph 30 of its resolution 687 (1991), concerning the release of Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and detainees and the return of the Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq;

3. *Welcomes* the appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), of Mr. Yuli M. Vorontsov as high-level Coordinator to follow up the issues of the release of Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and hostages and the return of the Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq; *stresses* the importance of the report he has submitted to the Security Council; and *welcomes* the statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the report;

4. *Affirms* that Iraq, in accepting Security Council resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) is deemed accountable for implementing paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 686 (1991) and paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1991), concerning Iraq's

responsibility under the relevant Security Council resolutions for reparations in respect of any direct loss or damage, including damage to the environment, depletion of natural resources and damage caused to foreign Governments or to their nationals and corporations;

5. *Affirms* Security Council resolution 949 (1994), in which the Council "demands ... that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq";

6. *Welcomes* the final communiqué adopted by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its twentieth session, held in Riyadh on 29 November 1999, in which the Council repeats its call to the Government of Iraq to show a genuine desire to cooperate with a view to securing the release of all Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and hostages and ascertaining their fate and further requests Iraq to demonstrate its peaceful intentions towards its neighbours;

7. *Welcomes* section A of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), in which the Council decides to establish the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which replaces the Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) of its resolution 687 (1991); *urges* Iraq to resume cooperation with the Security Council in this regard; *welcomes* the appointment of Mr. Hans Blix as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC; and *calls upon* Iraq to cooperate effectively with the Executive Chairman;

8. *Affirms* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq; *expresses* its sympathy with the people of Iraq in its plight; and *welcomes* in this regard the provisions of section C of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), concerning humanitarian initiatives for the purpose of meeting human needs and mitigating the suffering of the Iraqi people, while calling on the Government of Iraq to cooperate fully under the terms of the resolution;

9. *Emphasizes* that Iraq must respect the security, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait; *stresses* that it is imperative that Iraq should acknowledge frankly and unambiguously that its invasion and occupation of the State of Kuwait were in breach of the relevant inter-Arab, Islamic and international covenants and in violation of the Pact of the League of Arab States, the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Charter of the United Nations; and *renews* its invitation to Iraq to take the necessary measures to demonstrate by word and deed its peaceful intentions towards the State of Kuwait and its other neighbours so as to bring security and stability to the region;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to monitor the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report thereon to the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at its twenty-eighth session.

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Identical letters dated 10 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 10 July 2000 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, in which he draws your attention to the statement made on 26 June 2000 by the Vice President of the United States of America, Mr. Al Gore. In this statement, Mr. Gore reaffirms the United States commitment to support and finance armed terrorist activities aimed at overthrowing the national regime and fomenting civil war in Iraq. The Minister requests you to assume your legal and moral responsibilities, pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and to put up a determined resistance to these aggressive American acts, which represent a threat to the security and stability of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations and which could also undermine security and stability in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Saeed H. **Hasan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 10 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I should like to draw your attention to the meeting that was held on 26 June 2000 at the Department of State between the Vice President of the United States, Mr. Al Gore, the gang of client mercenaries of the United States Central Intelligence Agency which calls itself the Iraqi opposition and the leaders of the so-called Iraqi National Congress, the most senior of whom is a criminal wanted by Interpol for well-documented embezzlement. A joint statement was released on 26 June 2000 by the White House Office of the Vice President, in which the United States Administration reaffirmed its commitment to working with this gang, which represents no one and has no connection of any kind with Iraq or its people, with the aim of bringing down the national regime in Iraq. The United States Administration has undertaken to train 140 elements of this group in terrorist and spying operations. In the joint statement, the Vice President reaffirmed the Administration's strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and bringing him and his inner circle to justice for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. He said that Saddam's removal was the key to the positive transformation of Iraq's relationship with the international community and, in particular, with the United States.

Those who should be brought to justice for their war crimes are numerous United States officials, including Vice President Al Gore himself, who has been involved in the genocidal crimes which the United States Administration has been perpetrating against the people of Iraq for the last ten years. Some of the most heinous of those crimes include the following:

1. The insistence of the United States Administration on maintaining the oppressive sanctions which have been imposed on Iraq for the past ten years, depriving the Iraqi people of the most basic necessities for life, including food and medicine. These sanctions are, according to UNICEF reports, responsible for the deaths of 1.5 million Iraqi children. Through the sanctions, the United States Administration is carrying out the systematic genocide of the Iraqi people.

General Assembly resolution 96 (I) adopted on 11 December 1946 states that genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.

2. The United States and the United Kingdom have unilaterally and without any legal basis imposed two so-called no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq. These zones have been overwhelmingly rejected by the international community: demands for the repeal of this tyrannical decision are made at every meeting of the Security Council. The decision has also been rejected by three permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the Russian Federation, France and China, as well as by a large number of non-permanent members of that body.

Under the current Administration, of which Al Gore is one of the chief members and foremost policy-makers, this aggression represents a continuation of the antagonistic approach demonstrated by the United States on a daily basis, which has been one of its established policies since 1992. The daily brutal military attacks

against Iraq deliberately target innocent civilians. Heat flares are dropped with a view to incinerating agricultural crops, while the Iraqi people is suffering under oppressive sanctions the like of which have never been witnessed before. Al Gore and the most prominent members of his administration remain determined to continue the outrageous military attacks and to maintain the tyrannical sanctions in order to achieve political goals that are well known to all.

3. Al Gore and the leading members of his administration were involved in three grave acts of aggression carried out against Iraq in 1993 and 1996, as well as in the extensive 1998 operation known as Desert Fox, which caused the death and injury of hundreds of innocent civilians.

At a hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held on 28 June 2000, Senator Brownback quoted General Zinni, commander of United States Central Command, as saying that something must be done to encourage an attack on Iraq. He also reaffirmed the commitment of the current Administration to give military training to 140 elements of the so-called Iraqi National Congress and to provide them with military *matériel* in order to undertake military operations aimed at undermining the security and stability of Iraq. The United States Department of Defense is seeking to amend the rules of engagement for United States aircraft in order to include strikes against civilian targets in the north and south of Iraq and the irrigation barrages in the marshlands.

The information which I have brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and yourself provides further proof that the Government of the United States is determined, in its international relations, to follow an extremely dangerous course that is incompatible with the duties of a permanent member of the Security Council, which has a responsibility to respect the Charter of the United Nations and the international laws governing the relations between States. Notwithstanding that responsibility, it is using acts of aggression in order to achieve political aims.

This United States policy, and the executive operations carried out by United States officials at the highest levels, constitute a flagrant violation of every international legal provision, foremost among which are the Principles contained in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2625 (XXV), the provisions of which are considered by the International Court of Justice as part of international customary law and therefore binding upon States, as was stated in its 1986 judgement in the case between Nicaragua and the United States of America.

The statements made by Vice President Al Gore epitomize naked political hypocrisy. There is universal concern about such boundless hypocrisy, which is a common attribute of regimes that become tyrannical, divest themselves of all moral and spiritual values and become domineering and despotic, like a super-power, with all the power in the world, which imposes upon the world its own corrupt values and standards. As far as United States officials are concerned, a criminal is just the same as an innocent man, and a murderer no different from his victim. They permit themselves, following some law of the jungle, to bring random groundless allegations against the most illustrious people in the world, allegations that are

indicative of a loathsome and criminal mentality. The venom that has been spewed out against Iraq as a country, its leadership and people by the highest of officials in the United States Administration is the most obvious indication of the loathsome and criminal mentality of United States officials, which turns normal concepts on their heads, so that the criminal becomes a free man while the victim is fettered.

It is unequivocally clear from the foregoing that the United States is organizing and supporting armed and other operations aimed at overthrowing the national regime and fomenting civil war in Iraq. It is organizing, encouraging and financing terrorist activities carried out by a number of criminal mercenaries who are wanted by the law and have betrayed their country, and by the hirelings marshalled by the United States intelligence service. The United States is, furthermore, carrying out the systematic genocide of the Iraqi people.

We call upon you to express your rejection of this United States position, typified by interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, and to request the United States to halt such violations of international law as its inflammatory onslaughts against the security, independence and regional sovereignty of Iraq, given that this behaviour is directed against a State Member of the United Nations and is incompatible with the principles and Charter of the United Nations and with international law.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq urges the Security Council to assume its responsibilities, pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and to put up a determined resistance to these aggressive American acts, which constitute a threat to the security and stability of a sovereign State and could also undermine security and stability in the region.

(*Signed*) Mohammed Said **Al-Sahaf**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq

United Nations A/54/938–S/2000/688

General Assembly
Security Council

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13 July 2000

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General Assembly
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 63
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 July 2000, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter, its annex and appendix, which contains a letter of Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, concerning the ongoing rearmament efforts of the Greek Cypriot administration, would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Şafak **Göktürk**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

00-53345 (E) 170700

Annex to the letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of the letter dated 7 July 2000 addressed to you by Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, concerning the ongoing rearmament efforts of the Greek Cypriot administration.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Appendix to the letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to inform you that, while we are discussing prospects for peaceful reconciliation between the two parties in Cyprus at the third round of the proximity talks being held in Geneva, Greek Cypriot rearmament activities continue, casting a shadow on the spirit and very purpose of the talks aimed at preparing the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement.

The latest and most serious development in this regard is the approval by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives of an approximately $50 million expenditure for the purchase of the Milan 3 anti-tank missile system for the "National Guard". The system is known to be one of the most sophisticated anti-tank weapon systems in the world. The Greek Cypriot public and media have hailed the purchase as the biggest since the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system, which was diverted to Crete in the face of international pressure.

This development comes in the wake of statements by the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister, Mr. Socrates Hasikos, that the Greek Cypriot administration plans to purchase four more "Bell" helicopters, along with revelations that they also plan to include the Greek Cypriot "National Guard" in "Hermes", the mainland Greek Army's telecommunications network, as part of the 1993 joint military dogma between Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration. The statements were made by Mr. Hasikos shortly before he left for Greece to take delivery of a gunboat from Greece, as a gift of the Greek Government, amidst reports that the Greek Cypriot administration is trying to form the nucleus of a Greek Cypriot Navy.

Previously, Mr. Hasikos had declared that the Greek Cypriot rearmament campaign would continue "despite the ongoing proximity talks", because the Greek Cypriot side "does not have the luxury of taking a pause in its rearmament efforts". In an interview issued in the Greek Cypriot daily "Politis" of 27 February 2000, Mr. Hasikos indicated that "the current process of proximity talks and the expected third round would not have an effect on their rearmament efforts". He also boasted that, "from an operational standpoint, the joint military doctrine has reached its peak".

We believe that the Security Council should not only take note of these serious developments, which do not augur well for the success of the proximity process, but should also urge the Greek Cypriot side to stop its arming frenzy.

The fact that among the countries that sell weapons to the Greek Cypriot side there are permanent members of the Security Council is particularly disappointing for us, as it is not compatible with the efforts to make progress towards a peaceful settlement. I, therefore, request that you do what is necessary in this regard in the interest of the success of your efforts and peaceful reconciliation in Cyprus.

(*Signed*) Rauf R. **Denktaş**
President

United Nations A/54/939–S/2000/689

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 43
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to reiterate the commitment by Israel to correct what the United Nations considered to be infrastructure violations by Israel of the line of withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

This commitment stems from the desire of the Government of Israel to cooperate fully with the United Nations in ensuring the integrity of the "line of withdrawal", and is based upon Israel's understanding that there are no further claims regarding infrastructure locations along the line.

The Government of Israel trusts that the Secretary-General, as well as the officials of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), will be no less attentive to the constantly increasing number of violations of the line by Lebanon, as detailed in my letter to you dated 6 July 2000 (A/54/936-S/2000/661), and will take up these violations with the Government of Lebanon. Attached, in the annex to the present letter, is an updated list of these violations.

In addition, I wish to draw your attention to several territorial encroachments, in which extensive tracts of land on the Israeli side of the line are being used by Lebanese citizens for agricultural and other purposes, despite the clear fact that these areas are within Israeli territory, as indicated by the United Nations map of the "line of withdrawal" as presented to Israel on 6 July 2000. A list of these infractions is also attached in the annex to this letter. We trust that the Secretariat and the Security Council will duly take note of the above.

With the corrections made by Israel at the above-noted infrastructure locations along the line, the Government of Israel considers that there can be no reason for delaying the full implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), including the deployment of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area and in restoring international peace and security.

It should be recalled that the Secretary-General, in his report (S/2000/590), noted commitments expressed to him by the Government of Lebanon regarding

00-53331 (E) 140700

deploying Lebanon's armed forces "as soon as I have confirmed Israel's withdrawal in compliance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978)" (para. 38). At the conclusion of the report, the Secretary-General did confirm Israel's withdrawal as specified (para. 40). Moreover, the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), endorsed the Secretary-General's confirmation, and called upon the Government of Lebanon "to proceed with the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces as soon as possible, with the assistance of UNIFIL, into the Lebanese territory recently vacated by Israel".

Israel has completed the withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978), as confirmed by the Secretary-General and the Security Council. It is now incumbent on the other parties, chiefly the Government of Lebanon, to fulfil their commitments pursuant to the resolution.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda Lancry
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Lebanese territorial encroachments

Following is a partial list of instances of Lebanese encroachments on Israeli territory, involving Lebanese appropriation of land that is decidedly on the Israeli side of the withdrawal line. In particular, Lebanese individuals have cultivated Israeli territory in a number of locations on the Israeli side, among them:

- From the vicinity of ID69 towards ID71: along more than 800 metres and up to at least 220 metres deep.
- From ID73 towards ID72: along more than 650 metres and up to 30 metres deep.
- Between iD96 and ID98: along more than 400 metres and up to along 500 metres deep.
- North and south of ID104: along about 300 metres up to at least 50 metres deep.
- Between ID110 and ID111: along more than 150 metres up to 100 metres deep.

Additional Lebanese violations — updated

5 July 2000 — At 15:50 hours some 60 individuals from the Lebanese side of the border attacked a group of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the Israeli side, just south of the Phatma Gate, with a barrage of stones.

5 July — At 18:40 hours 10 individuals from the Lebanese side pelted a group of IDF soldiers on the Israeli side, in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate, with heavy objects.

5 July — At 18:44 hours 20 people from the Lebanese side attacked a group of IDF soldiers just south of the Phatma Gate with a barrage of stones.

5 July — At 20:17 hours approximately five individuals from the Lebanese side hurled objects at IDF soldiers just south of the Phatma Gate.

5 July — At 22:44 hours six individuals from the Lebanese side threw objects at IDF soldiers on the Israeli side, in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate.

6 July — At 12:57 hours five buses and four private cars from the Lebanese side drove to a point on the border opposite an IDF observation post near the Phatma Gate. Individuals stepped out of the vehicles and hurled objects towards the border fence.

6 July — At 13:12 hours some 200 people from the Lebanese side gathered near the border fence in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate and hurled stones at the fence.

6 July — At 17:57 hours individuals from the Lebanese side threw objects at an IDF observation post on the Israeli side just south of the Phatma Gate.

6 July — At 19:18 hours some 10 to 12 individuals from the Lebanese side hurled heavy objects at an IDF observation post and at a group of IDF soldiers on the Israeli side just south of the Phatma Gate.

6 July — At 21:59 hours individuals from the Lebanese side pelted an IDF observation post with stones, in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate.

7 July — At 10:25 hours some 20 people from the Lebanese side hurled objects at an IDF observation point just south of the Phatma Gate.

7 July — At 11:42 hours some 50 individuals from the Lebanese side threw objects at an IDF observation point near the Phatma Gate.

7 July — At 12:58 hours some 40 people from the Lebanese hurled stones at an IDF observation point near the Phatma Gate.

7 July — At 14:40 hours individuals from the Lebanese side (AMR: 20304/29868) threw objects at an IDF observation point at the Phatma Gate, then joined a larger crowd of individuals on the Lebanese side hurling objects across the border.

7 July — At 14:55 hours some 200 people from the Lebanese side hurled heavy objects at Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate.

7 July — At 19:45 hours civilian workers on the Israeli side just south of the Phatma Gate were attacked with stones hurled from the Lebanese side.

8 July — At 10:23 hours two armed individuals from the Lebanese side, carrying an equipment belt and visible guns, tried to open a gate in the border fence 100 metres east of B-17 (AMR: 17063/27827).

8 July — At 10:31 hours four individuals from the Lebanese side hurled heavy objects at a group of IDF soldiers in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate.

8 July — At 10:55 hours several individuals from the Lebanese side pelted Israeli soldiers with stones, at an area 2.5 kilometres south-east of the village of Shuba.

8 July — At 12:03 hours 15 people from the Lebanese side hurled objects at IDF soldiers near the Phatma Gate.

8 July — At 12:34 hours a large pipe was thrown by a number of individuals from the Lebanese side at IDF soldiers at the Phatma Gate.

8 July — At 14:45 hours an individual from the Lebanese side inflicted damage on the border fence 250 metres from the Phatma Gate (B-85).

8 July — At 15:01 hours some 10 individuals from the Lebanese side hurled heavy objects at IDF soldiers just south of the Phatma Gate.

8 July — At 18:03 hours 10 individuals from the Lebanese side threw objects at IDF soldiers near the Phatma Gate.

8 July — At 18:06 hours an armed person from the Lebanese side, wearing a uniform and brandishing weapons, threw objects at the border fence at BP-14 (AMR: 183988/273487) and damaged IDF equipment in the area.

8 July — At 22:34 hours a group of IDF soldiers in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate were pelted with stones thrown from the Lebanese side.

8 July — At 23:52 hours IDF soldiers who were repairing the fence at the Phatma Gate, that had been damaged earlier by individuals from the Lebanese side, were attacked with stones thrown from a rooftop in the village of Kile on the Lebanese side.

9 July — At 1:15 hours IDF soldiers at the Phatma Gate were pelted with objects hurled from the Lebanese side.

9 July — At 7:07 hours IDF soldiers just south of the Phatma Gate were pelted with bags thrown from the Lebanese side.

9 July — Between 10:27 and 16:32 hours 50 people from the Lebanese side hurled heavy objects at IDF soldiers just south of the Phatma Gate. One individual attempted to cut the border fence.

9 July — At 11:32 hours an individual from the Lebanese side penetrated into Israeli territory two kilometres east of the village of Rajar, where there is no border fence, then retreated back to Lebanon.

9 July — At 12:49 hours several individuals from the Lebanese side threw objects into Israel two kilometres east of the village of Rajar.

9 July — At 13:33 hours a group of IDF soldiers were pelted with stones thrown from the Lebanese side, in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate.

9 July — At 13:42 hours five individuals from the Lebanese side hurled objects at IDF soldiers just south of the Phatma Gate.

9 July — At 14:59 hours individuals from the Lebanese side threw objects over the border just south of BP-37 (AMR: 201503/295452).

9 July — At 16:32 hours an individual attempted to cut the border fence just south of the Phatma Gate (AMR: 20323/29778).

9 July — At 19:23 hours individuals from the Lebanese side threw objects at the border fence at B-26 (AMR: 177093/278733).

12 July — At 11:08 hours 15 individuals from the Lebanese side pelted an IDF observation point with stones in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate.

12 July — At 13:19 hours IDF soldiers at an observation point in the vicinity of the Phatma Gate were attacked with objects hurled by four individuals from the Lebanese side.

12 July — At 17:00 hours seven individuals from the Lebanese side attacked an IDF observation point in the vicinity of the Phatma gate with metal rods.

12 July — At 19:07 hours four individuals from the Lebanese side hurled heavy objects at IDF soldiers and at an IDF observation point near the Phatma Gate.

12 July — At 20:03 hours one armed individual from the Lebanese side joined several others in hurling objects across the border to the Israeli side (at location AMR: 17063/27827-W119).

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Letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 11 July 2000, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. **Annan**

00-53265 (E) 130700

Annex

Letter dated 11 July 2000 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the monthly report on operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) (see appendix). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Lord **Robertson** of Port Ellen

Appendix

Monthly report to the Security Council on operations of the Stabilization Force

1. During the reporting period (13 May-12 June 2000) there were approximately 22,900 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and from 15 non-NATO countries. Troops of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) continued to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations in the theatre by means of ground and air patrols. Operations across the SFOR area included area security, monitoring the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, monitoring the entity armed forces, conducting weapons storage site inspections, providing support to the international organizations in theatre and collecting weapons and ammunition within the framework of Operation Harvest 99. In addition, in the light of the recent elections in Montenegro, SFOR troops significantly increased their monitoring of the border with Montenegro.

2. SFOR troops continued to monitor compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1160 (1998), which prohibits the transport of weapons into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by providing an intensified presence on the ground in order to enforce the embargo. No violations were reported.

3. During the reporting period, SFOR also continued to monitor the movement of controlled petroleum products in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by establishing traffic control points. No violations were reported.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

4. The situation in theatre remained calm and stable during the reporting period, with the entities in substantial compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement. There were several isolated violent incidents, the most significant of which were an explosion in the Banja Luka apartment of the Minister of Health of the Republika Srpska on 24 May and the launch of an anti-tank rocket against a house in a resettlement site near Pocitelj, near Caplijna (Multinational Division South-East) on 29 May.

5. There were two significant demonstrations during the reporting period. In the first, which took place on 1 June, approximately 100 Bosniac women demonstrated along the Zavidovici-Tuzla road with the aim of preventing a visit by Bosnian S s to Vozuca. This was in retaliation for the Bosnian Serb reaction to Bosniac visits to Srebrenica earlier this year. As a result of the demonstration, the Bosnian Serb visit was cancelled. In the second demonstration, which was held on 12 June, a large group of Bosniacs, insisting on the reconstruction of their homes, blocked roads leading to the SFOR military training range in the municipality of Glamoc (Multinational Division South-West). Both demonstrations ended peacefully.

6. During the reporting period, SFOR troops conducted 359 military weapons storage site inspections. No violations were reported.

7. SFOR troops monitored 1,021 training and movement activities: 298 Bosniac; 89 Bosnian Croat; 546 Bosnian Serb; and 88 Federation. The training and movement

ban on the Republika Srpska Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade remains in force, as does the live firing ban imposed on the Pelican Range in Glamoc. The training and movement ban imposed on elements of the Bosniac Army at Rastanica (Multinational Division North) on 28 April (see S/2000/555, appendix, para. 9) was lifted on 15 May.

8. One unauthorized checkpoint was set up by local police near Pale on 14 April and was subsequently dismantled by the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF).

9. The summer demining season continued over the reporting period.

Cooperation with international organizations

10. Within its capabilities and in accordance with its mandate, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, including the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IPTF, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

11. SFOR continued to support minority returnees and refugees by delivering basic supplies over the period. During the month of May, there were 3,113 returns of displaced persons and refugees.

12. The Standing Committee on Military Matters met on 17 May, when the Presidency recognized the importance of meeting regularly and committed the Committee to meeting once a month as foreseen.

13. In preparation for the 11 November general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SFOR will assist OSCE by providing an enhanced security environment, a rapid response capability, limited equipment support, an exchange of liaison officers and 24-hour joint operational centre staffing.

Outlook

14. Isolated incidents of violence can be expected to continue, related to the return of refugees and displaced persons.

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Letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Djibouti to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the decision on Somalia adopted by the seventy-second ordinary session of the Council of Ministers, and subsequently endorsed by the Summit of the Heads of State and Government, of the Organization of African Unity.

I would appreciate it if the present document could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Djama Mahamoud **Ali**
Chargé d'affaires

00-53406 (E) 140700

Annex to the letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Djibouti to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

CM/Dec.526 (LXXII)

Decision on Somalia
(CM/2164 (LXXII)-f)

Council:

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the Report

2. **REAFFIRMS** the consistent position of the OAU regarding the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia, as one indivisible State;

3. **ACKNOWLEDGES** the seriousness of the situation in Somalia as a result of the long absence of national structure given the destructive civil strife and ensuring insecurity

4. **ACKNOWLEDGES ALSO** the commendable efforts exerted by the international community, in particular by IGAD Member States, especially by Ethiopia, a country mandated both by IGAD and OAU, the League of Arab States, toward the restoration of peace, stability and Government in Somalia;

5. **STRONGLY WELCOMES** the initiative launched by President Ismael Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, Current Chairman of IGAD, at the UN General Assembly on 22 September, 1999, which initiative was endorsed by leaders of IGAD at their Summit held in Djibouti on 26 November, 1999;

6. **RECALLS** the full support earlier extended to the initiative as well as the Peace Plan by the Council of Ministers of IGAD, OAU, League of Arab States, and lastly, on 29 June, 2000, by the UN Security Council;

7. **EXPRESSES ITS FULL SUPPORT** to the Djibouti-led IGAD peace process on Somalia, in general, and to the Somalia National Peace Conference now underway in Djibouti since May 2, 2000, in particular, which has already achieved tremendous progress; and which brought together over 2000 Somali participants from inside and outside the country, and consisting of all walks of life and sections of the society, including elders traditional and religious leaders, politicians, warlords, peace activists, professionals, business people, scholars, women, minorities and youth;

8. **NOTES** that the people of Djibouti, despite the prevailing economic hardship in the country, have made tremendous sacrifices toward contributing generously to a fund intended to finance this costly process, which has so far been almost entirely borne by Djibouti.

9. **APPEALS** to Member States of the international community as a whole, to extend political, material, financial and moral support to ensure the success of the Conference;

10. **URGES** all remaining warlords and other leaders not in Djibouti to join their Brothers and Sisters and to participate in the Conference which is aimed at seeking the future political direction of Somalia. In this regard, the Council **CALLS UPON** the International Community to exert maximum pressures on warlords and all those leaders who are obstructing the Peace Process, to desist forthwith in engaging in acts or actions designed to destabilize, obstruct, undermine, thwart or scuttle the conference, through threats, harassments and detention of people wishing to express their democratic rights to participate in the conferece;

11. **EXPRESSES GRAVE CONCERN** over the alarming deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and **APPEALS** to all Member States and the international community at large, to continue providing humanitarian assistance to those in need in Somalia;

12. **REITERATES ITS CALL** to all Member States to observe the UN arms embargo on Somalia to avoid further intensification of the conflict as well as to prevent Somalia from being used as a launching pad to acts of terrorism against neighbouring States;

13. **EXTEND** full political and material backing to the outcome of the Somalia National Peace Conference now in its final leg;

14. **CALLS UPON** the International Community to exert maximum pressure on those who continue to engage in hostile activities towards undermining and obstructing the process and who are depriving the Somali people of their inalienable rights to participate in the Conference that seeks to decide on their political future;

15. **STRONGLY APPEALS** to the international community as a whole (IGAD, OAU, UN, League of Arab States, EU, OIC, NAM, etc.) to provide all necessary assistance to the potential national transitional administration in Somalia, particularly reconstruction and development assistance, and rebuilding of institutions.

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Letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward a letter from Mr. Branko Lukovac, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Montenegro, addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding representation of the Republic of Montenegro in international relations (see annex). An aide-mémoire of the Government of the Republic of Montenegro on the matter and some facts from Montenegrin history are enclosed with the letter (see appendices).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the text of the present letter, its annex and appendixes, as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Samuel **Žbogar**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

00-53420 (E) 180700

Annex to the letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Chairman of the Security Council circulated on 21 June 2000 the non-paper entitled "Montenegro and the Balkan crisis" (S/2000/611), which reflects some views of the Government of Montenegro on problems in the region and on relations between Montenegro and Serbia. In paragraph 6 of the annex to that document it is stated, *inter alia*, that "... Montenegro does not accept the leadership of Serbia and its political and diplomatic representatives and services, misusing the administration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be the representatives of the policy and interest of Montenegro. They cannot do this on behalf of the state of Montenegro in future ... Montenegro will independently express, represent and protect its policy and its interests and inform other countries and international organizations thereon, either directly or through its authorized representatives."

Since we feel that some further clarifications are necessary, please find enclosed an aide-mémoire of the Government of Montenegro, stating reasons for such a move, as well as some facts from Montenegrin history, for consideration together with the above-mentioned non-paper.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter, together with its enclosures, circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Branko **Lukovac**

Appendix I to the letter dated 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Aide-mémoire of the Government of the Republic of Montenegro

Montenegro, as one of the federal republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has a very long history of statehood, lasting many centuries. Under specific circumstances, after the First World War, as a kingdom, it was first annexed by force and then made part of the newly created state of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; in the outburst of fascism, that state crumbled at the very beginning of the Second World War; Montenegro then joined the new Yugoslavia (known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), as a state of equal members and nations, in 1945. That state dissolved during the years 1991 and 1992, after the prevalence of the hegemonic and nationalist projects and forces. In April 1992, Montenegro and Serbia formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a federation consisting of two equal states. However, the territory of former Yugoslavia has been notorious for the whole decade of the 1990s for the wars fought there (in Slovenia and Croatia, as early as 1991 and 1992; then in Bosnia, until the end of 1995; and finally in Kosovo, where the international community still tries to establish peace and security for all citizens).

For Montenegro, life in the common state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since its inception, has not accomplished in any way the commitment of our people to its equal position as well as for the eventual dominance of democratic values and orientation, the rule of law, economic recovery, reforms and prosperity, or the cooperation with the world, strengthening of good-neighbourly relations and wider integrative processes. The position of Montenegro in the common state worsened, especially after the presidential and parliamentary elections in Montenegro, in 1997 and 1998, when the forces standing for democratic and economic transformation and pro-European orientation managed to achieve supremacy in the elections. That was the reason why the authorities in Serbia have never accepted the outcome of that election and have obstructed the formation of bodies of the common, federal state that would be based on the majority will of the citizens in Montenegro. Instead of them, they appointed their partisan and political sympathizers, who are now opposition in Montenegro, to be representatives from Montenegro to the federal bodies. Naturally, it was not acceptable for the democratically elected leadership, for the Montenegrin government and its bodies. Actually, since then, Montenegro has no access to the federal authorities, it does not participate in their work and, consequently, does not accept them as common, and does not recognize their legitimacy.

Moreover, the federal authorities constituted in that way have been used not only against the will of the Montenegrin legal authorities, but against Montenegro, with a view to its economic and general exhaustion, political destabilization and the toppling of the democratically elected government, without shrinking from attempts to provoke internal conflicts or a civil war. Here are just a few illustrative indicators:

(a) The negotiations concerning the Kosovo crisis, which ended in failure and led to the NATO bombing, were held without representatives of the Montenegrin authorities. The Supreme Defense Council made its decisions without participation of the president of Montenegro and those decisions had heavy consequences in human lives, material damages, economic and overall activity and the development of Montenegro and its international cooperation. Of course, the biggest tragedy was suffered and is still suffered by all peoples in Kosovo, including the Serbian people themselves. In addition to causing human and material losses, the Yugoslav Army was misused in an attempt of taking over some functions of the government authorities of Montenegro.

(b) The representatives of the legal authorities of Montenegro have been removed from all institutions of the federal state and the work of these bodies is used primarily against the interests of Montenegro. That is the case with many federal bodies: defence, internal and foreign affairs, finances, foreign trade, customs, central bank. Thus, for instance:

(i) The central bank, working without participation of Montenegrin representatives, kept issuing additional money and, in that way, undermined, *inter alia*, the economic and social security and political stability in Montenegro;

(ii) Montengrin companies were not approved for import and export licences, which disabled their normal operation;

(iii) The customs revenues were not used for funding obligations towards Montenegro;

(iv) Initiatives for joining some international alliances were made against the will of Montenegro and were directed against it;

(v) The Yugoslav Army has been used against the interests of Montenegro; for pressures and threats against its institutions; for interrupting its foreign trade exchange and good-neighbourly relations; as a service for propaganda from Belgrade towards Montenegro; for training paramilitary formations that may be misused against Montenegro;

(vi) Joint judicial authorities are put in the function of close partisan and political interests of Serbia and work under their orders;

(c) In 1998, the Federal Government stopped paying Montenegro the contribution for pension insurance of the persons for which it has such an obligation, from the joint funds of the federal budget;

(d) For quite a long time, competent federal authorities have been denying overflight licences to aircraft that would transport foreign tourists to Montenegro, or that would carry prominent foreign officials for meetings with members of Montenegrin authorities;

(e) Furthermore, the Serbian government — in response to the measures taken by the Government of Montenegro in order to protect the economic and social security of its citizens — imposed a comprehensive, heavy blockage of the overall payment operations and commodity trade with Montenegro that lasted for several months. It should be remembered that Montenegro, traditionally, used to buy more than 70 per cent of its essential foodstuffs and more than 80 per cent of drugs on the

Serbian market and that many firms were tailored to suit the needs of that market and were thus almost completely dependant on the trade with Serbia.

Due to severe violation of the Constitution and misuse of numerous federal institutions, Montenegro had to take steps to protect its interests, economy and citizens, as already stated. For these reasons, Montenegro assumed control of the activities in: foreign trade and import and export of goods and services; insurance and investment guarantees; production cooperation and joint ventures; tax system; customs; control of borders with other countries; monetary operations by legalizing German mark as a parallel tender, together with the local currency — the dinar. Systematic undermining of economy and overall life in Montenegro by the Belgrade authorities was, in that way, partially alleviated.

Owing to the increasingly massive and strong support of its citizens, Montenegro managed to resist such pressure; to preserve good inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations and, on top of it, to offer shelter to tens of thousands of exiled refugees from Kosovo, equally as, in earlier years, it offered shelter to refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (refugees account for about 10 per cent of the present population in Montenegro). Montenegro is firmly committed to strengthening of its democratic course; to needed transformations and economic development and to full cooperation with international community and integration into European processes and strictures. It continues to resist successfully various political, military, security and economic pressures and blockages exerted by Serbia. In that Montenegro enjoys increasing support and assistance, especially of the developed countries, among them the United States of America and Europe, in particular. Montenegro is an active participant in the stability pact for South-eastern Europe, as well as other regional processes (Adriatic-Ionian, Central European Initiative, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative), and it has an ever-wider cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe.

To date, Montenegro has shown a high degree of responsibility to its citizens and to its regional and wider surroundings, when peace and security in the region are concerned.

In spite of diametrically opposed political options in Serbia and Montenegro; entirely unequal relations between the two states, which are supposed to be equal under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; severe violation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; permanent attempts of destabilization of Montenegro and violent ousting of its democratically elected government; in spite of constant misuse of federal institutions by Serbia — Montenegro has exhibited patience and a constructive approach, as well as a wish to maintain good relations with Serbia and to keep some form of community with it. To that end, in August 1999, Montenegro offered to the state authorities of Serbia the proposed bases for new relations, that would rest on true equality of the two states and maintain the necessary framework, so that the citizens of both states could take advantage, for their own sake, of all the cultural similarities, historic ties, mutual economic and geographic direction and the benefits of successful integration processes. At the same time, they would be protected against misuses of common institutions which are performed with current authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

But, the state authorities of Serbia turned a deaf ear to such initiatives and proposals of Montenegro and there is no doubt that the present relations of domination suit them more. Both internally and externally, the leadership of Serbia obviously does not intend to give up its present orientation, which, after the four wars, enormous sufferings of people and damages to economy, full international isolation — has brought the country to a complete collapse.

For these reasons, Montenegro decided to deny its trust to the federal administration and its bodies and diplomatic services, fully controlled by the Serbia authorities, to represent Montenegro and its interests before other countries and international organizations. As stated in our document that was circulated by the Chairman of the United Nations Security Council on 21 June 2000, it will do that on its own and through its authorized representatives.

Podgorica, 6 July 2000

Appendix II to the letter of 13 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Montenegro: Historical facts

The Slavic social and state community Doclea, "Sclavinia", as the Byzantines called it, was formed at the beginning of the seventh century, on the territory of the previous Roman province Prevalis, within the borders and under the formal sovereignty of the Byzantine Empire. By their arrival and by the forming of their own state, the Slavs have fundamentally changed the situation and demographic composition of the province Prevalis. Doclea was founded on a geographically and historically compact area which covered the wider basin of Skadar lake and its surrounding mountain range. This area, later on, became the territorial base of all later stages of state-political organization of the Montenegrins.

At the end of the tenth century, Doclea was granted the status of independent state by the Byzantines, and Vladimir became the first Duke of Doclea. Independence was acquired by the Docleas people in 1040, and it became a kingdom in 1077, making "Zeta" among the first states in the Balkans to gain independence.

After the death of the first ruler of the dynasty of Vladimir and Vojislavljevic, Zeta was exposed to the permanent political conflicts and disunion among the nobility about who would sit on the throne, which led to the predominance of Byzantinium again, and in 1185 it was conquered by the Serbian state Raska and its ruler great duke Nemanja.

By including in his state "the kingdom of Dioclitia and Dalmatia", Nemanjici did not change the order prevailing during its previous independent state life, which had developed as a special tradition. In the second half of the fourteenth century Zeta became independent and separated from the power of the Serbian state under the leadership of Balsici dynasty and Crnojevici dynasty, and later on it became an independent feudal state. The Balsici achieved important territorial expansion through constant fighting against their neighbours: Albanians, Bosnians and Serbian nobility, as well as with Venice and Turkey, which were becoming more and more powerful.

Through the rise of the Crnojevici dynasty, Zeta, that is Montenegro, which is how it has been called ever since and also how the term Montenegrins was created, was constituted as a state, the social order of which was a mixture of feudal and tribal elements. During that period, Turkish attacks were becoming more frequent and stronger and therefore the territory of the Montenegrin state decreased and the people withdrew towards Mount Lovcen. For his new centre, Ivan Crnojevic chose Cetinje, where he built the castle and monastery which became the capital of the narrowed Montenegro, the spiritual and state centre of the liberation movement of Montenegrins during the next five centuries. During the reign of his son, Djuradj, the first printing house of the South Slavs was established in Cetinje in 1493, at which the first book in the Balkans, "Oktoih", was printed in 1494. After the short rule of Djuradj, Montenegro was conquered by the Turks in 1496.

After the establishment of Turkish power, Montenegro was annexed to the province of Skadar. From 1513, Montenegro was organized as a separate territorial

and government unit with an important degree of autonomy. The local government and judiciary were in hands of the permanent resident population, while military service referred only to the population on Montenegrin territory. However, its autonomous position remained untouched until after the Candia war (1645-1669), when full independence was returned to Montenegrins.

The ruling of the population and leading of the country was undertaken by the bishops of Cetinje, the general Gathering of Montenegrins and Gathering of leaders became the main state authorities and the leadership on the lower levels was entrusted to meetings of the nobility. In 1697, Montenegrins elected Danilo the First, a founder of the Petrovic dynasty, as bishop, and from that time an organized struggle for political and religious unity started in the country, which was frequently divided by conflicts among the nobility and islamization of the population.

By strengthening the throne of Peter the First Petrovic (1784-1830), who, according to the majority opinion, was the greatest person in the Montenegrin history, Montenegro made big steps towards establishing its independence. Especially after winning great victories over the more powerful Turkish army, every Turkish influence on Montenegro was eliminated, and it became, de facto, an independent and autonomous state. By merit of Peter the First, Montenegro overcame a long-lasting crisis. He united Montenegrins and their tribes. The influence and connections with Montenegrin coastal populations, who were under Austrian domination, had increased. During the reign of Peter the First, laws were passed by which the traditional, tribal organization of society was left behind and the basis of a modern state and government were created. In the 20 years of his rule, the poet and bishop Peter the Second Petrovic Njegos successfully conducted further building of the Montenegrin state by forming judicial, governmental and military authorities. During his travels he became acquainted with many European state leaders and other important persons, thus making Montenegro reputable all over Europe. By merit of Njegos, through the setting of borders, such as that specified by the agreement made by Austria in 1841, Montenegro became implicitly recognized by the major powers as a truly independent state with recognized borders and territory.

Njegos's successor, Duke Danilo, was more oriented towards the west. After his great military victory over the Turks at Grahovac in 1858, as well as determination of the state boundaries of Montenegro, which was recognized by the representatives of the major powers at the conference held in Constantinople in 1858, he contributed to the formal recognition of the sovereignty of Montenegro.

When, during the eastern crises of 1875-1878, Montenegro won marvellous victories over the Turkish troops (at Vuciji do and Fundina) during the rule of the Duke and King Nikolas, some of its political goals were achieved, including: full international recognition at the Congress of Berlin, where it obtained a part of the sea coast through the returning of Bar and Ulcinj and the cities of Podgorica and Niksic and Kolasin, to Montenegro. It was expanded and its territory was strengthened both economically and through growth of its population. In those expansions both the state and the army showed tolerance concerning the population, so that a great number of Albanians and Muslims continued to live in Montenegro, enjoying full rights, while their leaders got important state and military positions. The struggle of a small Montenegrin people, the only one in the Balkans that succeeded in resisting the Turkish empire through the centuries and in preserving its

freedom and autonomy, gained the sympathy and support of all of Europe. That, *inter alia*, enabled Montenegro to declare itself a kingdom in 1910.

Montenegro entered the First World War immediately after its declaration, fighting on the side of Serbia and the Alliances. After the capitulation of Austro-Hungary in 1916, King Nicolas Petrovic and his government went into exile in Italy, and then to France, from where they did not succeed either in becoming partners in the negotiations and peace conferences nor in promoting their project of federal state organization and the uniting of South Slavic peoples on an equal basis. In 1918 Montenegro was annexed to Serbia and lost its statehood, its army and its dynasty. Although a winning country and ally in the war, Montenegro was not successful in fighting against the plans and interests of Serbia and some big powers, so that, after ten centuries, its name disappeared from the political chart of Europe for the first time.

During that period, the expectations for the economic development and overall transformation of Montenegrin society was not fulfilled, and it remained the least developed area in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Through dictatorship and sharpened, sometimes bloody repressive measures, the regime tried to suppress the increasing dissatisfaction with the economic, political and national situation and the situation of human rights in Montenegro.

Immediately after the beginning of the Second World War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia crumbled in the tide of fascist Germany and Italy, the freedom-loving tradition of the Montenegrin people was also shown through national rebellion against the Italian conqueror on 13 July 1941, which, by its volume and solidarity, represents a unique example of that kind of event in Europe, and also greatly contributed to the anti-fascistic struggle in Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, the anti-fascistic movement renewed the struggle for the statehood and legal status of Montenegro. It became one of six equal republics in the new Yugoslav federation.

Since 1992, Montenegro, with Serbia, has been part of the federal community of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Notes

- The name Doclea was derived from the name of the Roman town near Podgorica, carrying the same name, and the Illyrian tribe Decleati.
- At the end of the twelfth century, the name Zeta, derived from the Slavic expression for harvesters, which was transformed from the native country of the Slavs, Polablja-East Germany, was used in reference to the state.
- The name Montenegro is derived from the black woods when the centre of the state was moved towards Mount Lovcen -Cetinje.